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Does auctioning of entry licenses affect consumer prices?
An experimental study
Abstract
On an increasing scale auctions are used to allocate the licenses to operate on markets which are thought
not suited for free entry. According to standard economic arguments, the license fees paid at the auction will
not affect consumer prices since they constitute a sunk cost. This standard view is not uncontested though.
In the present paper we experimentally investigate two arguments for a potential upward effect of auctioning
on prices: the incorporation of entry fees in prices due to the use of mark-up pricing rules, and the tendency
of auctions to select the more collusive firms. Our results indicate that auctioning increases the probability
of high prices, and that this is mainly due to the use of mark-up pricing rules. 
      Often also the firms' customers adhere to this line of reasoning. For example, the International1
Telecommunications Users Group is strongly opposed to auctioning of scarce telecom resources like radio
frequencies, numbering space and orbital slots on the ground that "funding of auction bids creates a debt-
1
1. Introduction
At several markets entry is limited for natural reasons such as geographical bounds or technological
restrictions. Examples are mobile telecommunication, broadcasting, petrol stations, oil drilling, airport slots,
and vendor locations at fairs. Governments can use different procedures to allocate the licenses to operate
on such markets. Lotteries, queuing (first-come-first-served) and rotation are being used, but most common
is some kind of administrative process (beauty contest). 
The last decade, however, has witnessed an increased use of auctions as a means to allocate entry
licenses. A prime example is the global trend to auction the rights to use the spectrum. The advantages of
auctions are well-known. Compared to administrative processes in particular, auctions are quicker, involve
lower transaction costs, and are less prone to rentseeking activity. More importantly, auctions tend to assign
licenses to the firms that value them most, and, to a first approximation, these are also the firms that will
put the licenses to their most efficient use from a social welfare point of view. Finally, the license fees paid
by the auctions winners are seen as welcome revenue to governments, diminishing their need to rely on
distortive taxes. Auctions prove that these revenues can be considerable indeed. The auctioning of spectrum
licenses in the US has already raised over 20 billion dollars. Revenues for the auctioning of the third
generation mobile spectrum licences promise to be spectacular. The recent UK auction of 5 such licences
yielded a staggering revenue of 22.5 billion UK pounds.
Yet, the acclaimed benefits of auctions are not uncontested. In particular, it is often argued that
auctioning will increase the prices that consumers ultimately pay. Many companies claim that they will have
to charge higher prices in order to recuperate the entry fee. For example, in reponse to plans by the Dutch
government to auction the locations for petrol stations along the highways, oil company Shell argues that
"auctioning the selling points drives up costs. After all, just like the auctioning of locations at fun fairs by
local governments, ultimately these costs will have to be included in the product price. The extra revenue
to the government will ultimately be paid by the motorists" (Shell, 1999). The criticism from these
companies is perhaps not too surprizing. After all, they have to pay substantial fees for licenses which often
they used to get for free.  Interestingly though, even some policy-makers and regulators seem reluctant to1
financing burden for the succesful bidder. This must then be serviced by income during the operating period
of the license won by the bid. The cost of financing the debt is therefore borne by the end customer of the
licensed service" (INTUG, 1999). 
      The French were noteworthy for being creative in finding new offices to be sold. There existed, for2
example, inspectors of hogs' tongues and controllers of perukes. When Louis XIV asked his Controller-
General Pontchartrain how he always succeeded in finding new people interested in buying new offices,
Pontchartrain answered: "Your majesty forgets one of his most beautiful privileges, i.e., as soon as the king
institutes an office, God creates a fool who will buy it" (Swart, 1980, p.15).
      Notice furthermore that in an auction firms are never forced to bid more than their expected value of3
obtaining the license. In other words, the bids to enter the market will be based on (expected) market prices
and not the other way around. Hence, when firms bid rationally, they will be able to earn at least a normal
return on their investments, whatever the funding source of these investments. There is a caveat to the sunk
cost argument though (see, e.g., McMillan, 1995). With an imperfect capital market, the interest rate may
be increasing in the amount borrowed, and an increased marginal cost of capital may reduce a firm's
efficiency enhancing investments, leading to a higher marginal cost.
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use auctions. The European Commission states that "reliance on auctions should not lead to an excessive
transfer to the public budget or for other purposes to the detriment of low tariffs for the users" (European
Commission, 1994, proposed position I.11). Hence, there is a rather widespread concern that auctioning
of licenses may lead to higher consumer prices. 
Auctioning the rights for privileged positions is not a new phenomemon. From the late Roman
times, rulers all around the world have to a greater or lesser extent relied on the sale of offices to highest
bidders in order to generate income (Swart, 1980). For example, in the Dutch republic much sought offices
like postmaster, clerk, broker, porter and carrier were often publicly sold to the highest bidder from the 16-
th to the 18-th century. The practice of selling offices was most pronounced in 17-th century France, where
the kings needed large amounts of money to fulfil their costly appetites for waging wars and building
luxurious palaces. The French sold virtually all public offices.  Even at the time, the selling of offices was2
criticized for multiple reasons, one of them being that the buyers of offices would recoup their losses by
charging high prices for their services.
Theorists easily find the flaw in this line of reasoning (see, e.g., McMillan, 1995, Van Damme,
1997). Once the right to operate in a market has been obtained, the fee paid in the auction constitutes a sunk
cost. Firms interested in expected profit will base their decisions on an evaluation of marginal revenues and
marginal costs, and these are unaffected by sunk costs (or fixed costs, for that matter).  Bygones are3
bygones, as the saying goes. Hence, from the standard theoretical perspective the argument for increased
prices does not seem to make much sense. 
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This does not guarantee though, that the argument is empirically incorrect. A longstanding debate,
initiated by a survey study by Hall and Hitch (1939), is whether the pricing decisions by firms do in fact
adhere to the marginalist principles (see Mongin, 1992, for an exposition of the controversy). Also more
recent empirical studies suggest that firms often employ some kind of mark-up or full-cost pricing rule. This
evidence is usually based on interviews and questionnaires (e.g., Blinder, 1992, Hall et al., 1997). Hence,
it cannot be excluded that managers say, or even think, that they apply mark-up pricing rules, whereas in
fact their decisions adhere to the principles of marginalism. In any case, if it is true that firms employ mark-
up pricing rules, then an entry fee may indeed increase prices.
Furthermore, there exists another potential upward pressure on prices as a result of auctioning
(which to our knowledge has not been put forward before). Empirical studies suggest that a wide variety
of outcomes can be observed in oligopolistic markets. Some industries seem to be more competitive than
the static Nash equilibrium, others are more cooperative than Nash (Martin, 1993; Slade, 1994). This
observation is corroborated by the experimental literature. There, also outcomes on either side of Nash are
observed in oligopoly games (Holt, 1995). If firms with more cooperative or collusive strategies on average
earn higher profits than firms with competitive strategies, then it seems reasonable to predict that firms with
a more cooperative orientation expect to earn higher profits than firms with a more competitive orientation.
An auction may then have the effect of selecting the more optimistic firms, and, to the extent that these are
also the more collusive types, this may have an upward effect on prices.
Unfortunately, no empirical data are available for a reliable statistical analysis of the relation
between entry fees and consumer prices. Yet, the following stylized facts for mobile voice
telecommunication are noteworthy. Within the European Union the highest license fees (more than 200
million Euros for the most valuable licenses) have been paid in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Ireland, and the lowest fees (less than 5 million Euro) in Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal (EU,
1999a). Annual tariffs for a representative basket of services average about 750 Euro in the former four
countries, but only 550 Euro in the latter four countries (EU, 1999b). For example, Ireland and
Luxembourg are the two countries with only two mobile operators. The most expensive license in Ireland
was 216 million Euro and average annual tariffs are about 1300 Euro. Luxembourg had license fees less
than 4 million Euro and annual tariffs of about 700 Euro. These figures hint at a positive relation between
entry fees and consumer tariffs. 
Reliable conclusions cannot be based on these data though. The number and relative size of the
      The symmetric setup implies that our experiments do not incorporate the potential of auctions to select4
the most (productively) efficient firms. This allows for the cleanest test possible of the two arguments put
forward for an upward price effect of auctioning entry licenses. Of course, an overall assessment of
auctioning should include these (and other) beneficial effects of auctions. We will come back to this in our
concluding discussion.
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firms vary considerably across the different markets. Also, the quality of the services varies across firms
and countries, making average tariffs difficult to compare. Furthermore, the entry fees do not relate to
identical licenses (GSM, DCS, local/nation-wide), and the time path and the method of selection (auction,
beauty contest, fixed fee) are not uniform accross countries. Therefore, is it very difficult to analyze the
relation between entry fees and consumer tariffs on the basis of industry data. If data are available at all,
a comparison of entry fees and consumer prices across markets is confounded by differences in market
structure, product characteristics, timing, and selection procedures.
Therefore, in the present paper we rely on the experimental method to investigate the strength of
the two arguments outlined above. Does auctioning of entry licenses lead to an increase of market prices?
And, if so, is this increase due to the use of mark-up pricing rules, to a selection of the more collusive
players, or perhaps to both? To examine these questions we set up an experimental market, corresponding
to a symmetric price-setting duopoly with product differentiation.  We employed three stylized allocation4
treatments. In the Auction treatment, we had four subjects bidding for the right to enter the market, and
paying their bids in case they were among the two highest bidders. In the Fixed Cost treatment, the entry
rights were randomly assigned, and the two selected entrants had to pay an exogenous entry fee, comparable
in size to the highest bids in the Auction treatment. In our Baseline treatment, finally, the entry rights were
also assigned randomly, but now the two entrants did not have to pay any entry fee at all.
With this design, a potential price effect of auctioning shows up by comparing the market prices
in the Baseline treatment with those in the Auction treatment. Moreover, the design allows us to attribute
such a price effect to mark-up pricing (by comparing the Baseline treatment and the Fixed Cost treatment),
or to selection of the more collusive players (by comparing the Fixed Cost treatment and the Auction
treatment).
The results show that the critics' concerns for higher prices are not completely unfounded.
Auctioning the entry licenses leads to significantly higher prices. The results suggest that the effect of
auctioning should be mainly attributed to mark-up pricing. In particular, we find a significant price
difference between the Baseline treatment, on the one hand, and the Auction treatment and Fixed Cost
5
treatment, on the other hand, but average prices in the latter two treatments are almost identical. The price
effects of the three different assignment mechanisms are to some extent time-dependent. They are stronger
after the entry rights are assigned for the first and second time, than after they are assigned for the third and
fourth time. Even in the latter instances though, we find a significantly positive correlation between the entry
fees and the prices charged.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives a more
detailed outline of the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 provides details of the experimental design and
procedure. Section 4 presents the experimental result and section 5 contains a concluding discussion.
2. Model and hypotheses
The market that we induced in our experiments is a textbook example of a symmetric linear price-setting
duopoly with product differentiation (e.g., Martin, 1993, p.38). One reason to opt for price-setting is that
the argument against the use of auctions usually refers to firms increasing their prices rather than decreasing
their quantities. Furthermore, most of the markets of interest, seem to be characterized by at least some
degree of product differentiation. The parameters of the model are chosen such that three benchmark
outcomes - Nash, collusion, Walras - are well within the set of feasible prices. Furthermore, we wanted
these three outcomes to lead to substantially different profit levels, with the Nash profits about midway
between the competitive profits (of zero) and the collusive profits.
Specifically, demand and costs, respectively, are given by
q  = max[0, 124 - 2p  + 1.6p ] i … j = 1,2 (1)i i j
and
c(q ) = 10q i = 1,2 (2)i i
Profits are thus equal to
B (p ,p ) = (p -10)q i … j = 1,2 (3)i i j i i
      To have the outsiders observe prices and profits of insiders seems closer to real world settings than5
giving them no information. Also, the decision to have subjects gain some familiarity with the market before
any entry auctions take place, is partly motivated by the empirical observation that potential entrants (e.g.,
in telecom) are often firms with substantial experience, either at the very same market, at related product
markets, or at similar markets in other geographical areas.
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Firms simultaneously choose prices, with p  å [0,200]. It is straightforward to verify that the best replyi
functions are given by
p (p ) = 36 + 0.4p (4)*i j j
The unique stage game Nash equilibrium is equal to (p ,p ) = (60,60) with corresponding profits of (B ,B )N N N N1 2 1 2
= (5000,5000). It is easy to check that joint profit maximization leads to the collusive outcome (p ,p ) =C C1 2
(160,160) with corresponding profits of (B ,B ) = (9000,9000). The competitive Walrasian outcome, withC C1 2
prices equal to marginal cost and maximal social welfare, is characterized by (p ,p ) = (10,10) andW W1 2
(B ,B ) = (0,0). These outcomes summarize the main features of the model.W W1 2
The best reply functions are quite flat. As a consequence, (full) collusion is a risky enterprise. For
example, when firm 1 prices at p  = 160, firm 2 will be tempted to set its price at p  = 100. Corresponding1 2
profits are B  = 0 and B  = 16200. Hence, relative to the collusive profits of 9000, both the loss (-9000) and1 2
the temptation (+7200) of cheating are substantial.
In all three treatments of the experiment, subjects first play this market game for 10 periods against
the same opponent. After the tenth period, each subject is randomly allocated to a group of four (among
which is his or her opponent from the first ten periods). These groups remain fixed until the end of the
experiment (period 30). Before the start of the 11-th, 16-th, 21-th and 26-th period, two of the four subjects
are selected to play the market game for another five periods against each other. The two subjects that are
not selected to play receive an opportunity payment of 1000 per period. Furthermore, they are informed
about the prices and profits of the two subjects in their group that are playing the game.  After the five5
periods are over, there is a new selection of two players from the group of four subjects for the next block
of five periods, or, after period 30, the experiment is over.
The three treatments of our experiment differ in the manner in which the two players are selected
from the group of four subjects at the beginning of periods 11, 16, 21, and 26. The first allocation
mechanism that we consider is the Auction treatment. Here each of the four subjects submits a bid for the
7
right to service the market for the next five periods, and the two highest bidders are allowed to enter the
market. We use a discriminative sealed-bid auction in which the two highest bidders pay their respective
bids, B  and B , as entry fees (and random assignment in case of ties). For each of the four blocks of five1 2
rounds there is a separate auction. The second mechanism is called the Fixed Cost treatment. The two
subjects who are randomly selected to enter the market pay exogenous sunk entry costs, S  and S , respec-1 2
tively. Like the bids in the auction, these costs are private information. To allow for the cleanest possible
comparison between this treatment and the previous treatment, we have chosen to match these sunk costs
exactly with the fees paid by the subjects in the Auction treatment. For each group of four subjects in the
Auction treatment we observe a sequence of four winning bid-pairs and we induce the very same sequence
of entry fees for a group of four subjects in the Fixed Cost treatment. Hence, for each observation of entry
fees (B ,B ) in the Auction treatment, we also have an observation with S =B  and S =B  in the Fixed Cost1 2 1 1 2 2
treatment. Also the sequence of fees is exactly matched. Finally, in our Baseline treatment the two subjects
who enter the market for free are randomly selected from the group of four. An independent lottery is
performed for each of the four blocks of five periods.
These three treatments allow us to test three main hypotheses regarding the assignment of entry
licenses. To spell out these hypotheses and their predictions, P , P  and P  will be used to refer toBL FC AU
average prices in the Baseline, Fixed Cost, and Auction treatment, respectively.
Sunk Cost Hypothesis: P  = P  = PBL FC AU
This hypothesis is based on the standard argument that an entry fee is a sunk cost which is irrelevant for
the pricing decisions of the firms once they have entered the market. Profit maximizing firms will base their
prices on marginal cost and revenue calculations and these are not affected by the cost of entry. The entry
fees are simply a lump sum transfer from the firms (subjects) to the government (experimenter).
Under the assumptions that firms will repeatedly play the stage game Nash equilibrium when they
are at the market, that they will forecast this when they are at the bidding stage, and that they will engage
in non-cooperative bidding, we can also predict what their bids will be in the auction. In the repeated play
of the stage game Nash equilibrium of the market game each firm will make a profit of 5000 per period,
and it will receive an opportunity payment of 1000 per period when it is not active in the market. Winning
the auction gives the right to enter the market for five periods. Since all four firms are in identical positions,
      The hypothesis is also in line with experiments in which people are observed to fall prey to a sunk cost6
fallacy (see, e.g., De Bondt and Makhija, 1988, Kogut, 1990, Kogut and Phillips, 1994). People tend to
overcommit resources to a particular investment project, even after evidence has become available indicat-
ing that the project should be stopped. Hence, it seems that people often find it difficult to disregard sunk
costs. Relatedly, in the empirical finance literature it is sometimes found that investors are reluctant to
accept losses and hang on to assets for too long. Loss aversion has been pointed at as potential explanation
for this phenomenon.
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in equilibrium they will each enter a bid of 20000 ((5000-1000) times 5). Hence, all supra-normal profits
will be skimmed by the auction. But even if these game-theoretic assumptions fail for some reason, still the
standard neoclassical hypothesis would be that the assignment of entry right does not affect the pricing
decisions. Therefore, we should observe the same prices in the Baseline, Fixed Cost, and Auction treatment.
Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis: P  < P  = PBL FC AU
This hypothesis relates to the argument that firms will try to recoup (at least part of) the entry fee by means
of higher prices. As we noted in the introduction, this is the hypothesis put forward by many industry
representatives, from the companies involved, their costumers, as well as some of their regulators. The
hypothesis is in line with survey evidence on the pricing rules employed by firms. On the basis of a survey
among 654 UK companies, Hall et al. (1997) find that, although market conditions are of primary
importance, many companies set prices on the basis of cost plus a mark-up. In particular, 47% of the firms
recognize this as an important pricing principle. In a similar study among 72 US firms, Blinder (1991) finds
that 57% of the firms regard cost-based pricing to be an important behavioral principle. For wholesale and
retail firms there is also some econometric evidence that pricing strategies often deviate from marginalist
principles and are more in line with cost mark-up pricing rules (e.g., Nooteboom, 1985, van Dalen and
Thurik, 1998).6
The mark-up hypothesis can be made a bit more precise. Remember that in our experiment the
players first play the market game for 10 periods. Suppose that they arrive at the stage game Nash
equilibrium during or at the end of these 10 periods. They will then be pricing at p  = 60, with a cost mark-i
up of p -c = 50, produce at q  = 100, and make profits of B  = 5000. In the Fixed Cost and Auctioni i i
treatment they will have to pay an entry fee in order to be in the market for another 5 rounds. Let this entry
fee be equal to K, which corresponds to an entry cost of k = K/5 per round. Now, if players would be
tempted to keep the mark-up over average costs constant, they would have to charge a price such that p  -i
      It is easily verified that a price of 110 by both firms would consistently allow them to maintain a mark-7
up of 50.
      For example, in the duopoly price-setting experiments with complete information of Fouraker and8
Siegel (1963, experiment 16), there is a positive correlation between a firm's average price and his average
9
c - k/q  = 50. Inserting c = 10, k = 20000/5 = 4000 (Nash bidding), and q  = 100 would yield a price of pi i i
= 100. Of course, this kind of mark-up pricing would be myopic. First of all, with a price of p  = 100 (andi
p  = 100), q  will not be equal to 100 but drop to 84.  Second, at prices of p  = p  = 100 (or any price abovej i 1 2
7
the stage game Nash equilibrium), both players will have an incentive to reduce their prices. After all, the
unique stage game equilibrium is p  = p  = 60. 1 2
Clearly, mark-up pricing cannot be an equilibrium strategy when all players are rational profit
maximizers. Yet, when the population of players consists of a mixture of profit maximizers and mark-up
pricing players, then it may be possible to sustain mark-up pricing by all players as an equilibrium in the
repeated game. In particular, suppose a rational player believes that there is some (small) probability that
his opponent is irrational and applies mark-up pricing upon entering the game followed by a tit-for-tat
pricing strategy. Then it may be optimal for the rational player to start off with mark-up pricing as well and
to deviate from this price only in the final period(s). This argument is in line with the support for
cooperative outcomes in finitely repeated games with incomplete information (Kreps et al., 1982, Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1986). The point is that players need to be "real" mark-up players only with some (small)
probability in order to induce other players to behave in a likewise manner. We will come back to this
below.
Selection Hypothesis: P  = P  < PBL FC AU
The selection hypothesis is based on the assumption that an auction will tend to select the firms with the
highest profit expectations. Since the cost and demand conditions of the firms are identical in our market
game, each firm's profit expectations will largely depend on its subjective beliefs about its own and the other
firm's pricing behavior. A firm's subjective beliefs could be based on introspection but are more likely to
be based on prior experience. Whatever the source of the beliefs, the selection hypothesis is based on the
supposition that firms which expect to earn relatively high profits are also the firms which will tend to be
relatively collusive, charging relatively high prices.8
profit. Within each duopoly the firm with the lower average price typically earns the higher profit. Across
all duopolies, however, the higher price firms earn more money than their more competitive counterparts.
See Offerman et al. (1998) for a similar result in a quantity-setting oligopoly.
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Since self-selection of the more collusive type of players can only take place in the Auction
treatment, the selection hypothesis implies that prices will be higher in the latter treatment than in the
Baseline or Fixed Cost treatment, where the assignment of entry rights is fully exogenous.
Summarizing, the Selection Hypothesis argues that auctioning the licenses has an impact on prices
because the auction will tend to select those firms that will charge the highest prices. The Mark-up
Hypothesis, on the other hand, postulates that the pricing behavior of each individual firm that enters the
market will be affected by the entry fee resulting from the auction. These two possible effects of auctioning
are not mutually exclusive. Our main reason to include the Fixed Cost treatment, is precisely to be able to
separate these two effects and assess their relative force.
The present experimental study is not the first to examine the effect of entry fees on game playing
behavior. The first study, as far as we know, is Güth and Schwarze (1983), who auctioned proposer and
responder positions in an ultimatum game and found this to make proposer demands somewhat more
‘greedy’ (see also Güth and Tietz, 1985). More recently, it has been found that auctioning the right to play
may serve as a selection principle that helps players to coordinate on the Pareto superior equilibrium in
coordination games (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1993). Exogenously fixed entry fees may also affect
the equilibria that are selected in coordination games (Cooper at al, 1993, Camerer and Cachon, 1996). One
important difference between these experiments and the present one though, is that the stage game in our
experiment has a unique Nash equilibrium. We will come back to this below.
3. Experimental Design
We had six experimental sessions, two for each of the three treatments. Each session hosted 20
subjects, except one session in the Auction treatment in which we had only 16 students due to no-shows.
In a session all interaction took place within groups of four subjects, yielding 5 independent observation per
session in the five sessions with 20 subjects and 4 observations in the session with 16 subjects. Hence, in
total we have 10 independent observations for both the Baseline and Fixed Cost treatments, and 9 for the
      The program is written in Turbo Pascal using the RatImage library. Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)9
provide documentation of this library.
      Subjects could only choose integer prices. This does not affect the benchmarks discussed in section10
2, except for the fact that besides the stage game Nash equilibrium of (p ,p )=(60,60) there is an1 2
N N




Undergraduate students of Tilburg University were recruited as subjects. In total we had 116
subjects. Sessions lasted for about 1½ hours, and earnings averaged 43.55 Dutch guilders, which is about
21.75 US$. 
Upon entering the room subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory behind tables with
partitions. Instructions were distributed and read aloud. All interaction took place by means of networked
computers.  Each experimental session consisted of two parts, with the instructions for part 2 being9
distributed only after the completion of part 1. In part 1 subjects first went through a practice round. Then
they played the price-setting game outlined above for 10 periods with a fixed, randomly assigned opponent,
and subjects were informed about this. Profits were denoted in points, which at the end of the experiment
were converted into cash at a rate of 2000 points = 1 Dutch guilder.
The market structure was common information. It was explained how a subject's own price and the
other subject's price would affect the demand for their product. This was explained both with a formula and
in words. Subjects also had access to a pocket calculator, and to a table reporting quantity as a function of
own price and other's price. Demand was simulated in the experiment: no subject had the role of consumer.
Profit functions were also explained, in words and with a formula. Subjects were also told how the other
subject's production and profits were determined. They were not given a profit table though.
After all subjects in the session had entered their prices, they received feedback information about
their own and their opponent's price, quantity, revenue, cost and profit.  Information from earlier periods10
was not available on screen, but they could keep track of this themselves by means of a results table (and
most of them did). No information about other pairs was revealed.
Part 2 consisted of another 20 periods of the same game, divided in 4 blocks of 5 periods. Subjects
were informed that they were assigned to a group of four subjects, that these groups would remain fixed
throughout part 2, and that in each block of 5 periods two of them would be selected to enter the market
together. The two inactive subjects received a fixed payment of 1000 points per period, that is, 5000 for
      Since we had 9 groups in the Auction treatment and 10 in the Fixed Cost treatment, the sequence of11
entry fees from one group in the Auction treatment was used twice in the Fixed Cost treatment.
Furthermore, one subject in the Auction treatment entered a bid of 41270 in his first auction. After the
experiment, he indicated that this had been a mistake since he had based his profit expectations on 10
periods of part 1 (instead of 5 periods). Therefore, we decided to divide this fee by two for the Fixed Cost
treatment.
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a block of five periods, and were informed about the prices and profits of the two active subjects.
As explained in the previous section, the procedure to select the two subjects entering the market
distinguished the three treatments. In the Baseline treatment the subjects entering the market were randomly
selected, with an independent lottery being used for each of the four blocks of five periods and for each
group of four subjects. In the Auction treatment, subjects entered bids for the right to be in the market for
a block of five periods. Within each group of four subjects, the two with the highest bids were selected to
enter the market, and their bids were subtracted from their earnings. Bids were restricted to integer values
between 0 and 50000 points. Subjects received no information about the bids of other subjects from their
own groups or from other groups. In the Fixed Cost treatment, the subjects selected to enter the market had
to pay an exogenous entry fee. They were given no information about how this fee was determined or about
the fees of other subjects. In fact, the entry fees were exact copies of the entry fees generated in the Auction
treatment. An Auction session was run first, and the sequence of highest bids generated by a group of four
subjects in this session was also imposed upon a group of four subjects in the Fixed Cost treatment.11
At the end of period 30, subjects' profits (net of entry fees) were added up. The subjects filled in
a questionnaire before they were privately paid their earnings in cash.
4. Results
This section provides tests of the Sunk Cost hypothesis, the Mark-up Pricing hypothesis, and the
Selection hypothesis. This section will be broken into four parts. In the first part we will focus on a simple
comparison of the average price levels in the three treatments. This part provides a first crude overview of
the results. In the second part we will present the bidding data of the Auction treatment. In the last two parts
we will delve deeper in the data and look for more refined evidence for the three hypotheses.
      Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, we carry out prudent statistical tests throughout the paper using12
average variables per independent observation as data points.
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4.1 Overview of the results
Figure 1 gives a general impression of the development of prices in the three treatments. It can be
seen that in part 1 (period 1-10) the development of prices is by and large the same for the three treatments.
Average prices start out somewhat above the stage game Nash equilibrium of 60, and then decrease to about
60 in period 3. From period 3, average prices remain approximately stable. There is a small drop in prices
in period 10. Between periods 6 and 10 the average price level is somewhat higher in the Fixed Cost
treatment than in the Auction and the Baseline treatment. The difference is far from significant, however
(Mann-Whitney test result for Fixed Cost versus Baseline treatment: m=10, n=10, p=0.88; for Fixed Cost
versus Auction treatment: m=10, n=9, p=1.00).  Since the design of part 1 is identical for the three treat-12
ments, we would not expect to see any significant differences between them.
Figure 1. Average price levels in the three treatments
In period 11, when entry rights have been assigned for the first time, prices increase sharply in both
the Fixed Cost and the Auction treatment, but to a much lesser extent in the Baseline treatment. Prices then
show a downward trend in all treatments up until period 15. 
In period 16, when entry rights have been newly assigned, again prices increase in the Fixed Cost
and Auction treatment. Now, however, the increase in the Baseline treatment is of about the same
magnitude. In the remaining periods of this block prices decrease in the Baseline treatment, but stay at about
the same level in the Fixed Cost and Auction treatment. As a consequence, the distance between the former
and the latter two treatments even widens somewhat.
In period 21 there is a sharp increase in prices in the Baseline treatment. There is no similar
increase in the other two treatments. The decline of prices within the block of 5 periods is also less
pronounced in the Baseline treatment than in the other two treatments. As a consequence, the gap between
the treatments becomes much smaller. 
In the final block of five periods, prices stay at about the same level in the Baseline treatment and
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show a reversed U-shape in the other treatments, with the downward trend being sharper in the Auction than
in the Fixed Cost treatment. As a result, the average price difference between the treatments has almost
disappeared in the final period.
The pattern in the Baseline treatment is similar to the one observed by Murphy (1966): in a duopoly
setting he found the result that an initial downward trend in prices was followed by an upward trend. Notice
that in the Baseline treatment subjects start pricing higher than the Nash price of 60. Then follows a phase
where they 'undershoot' compared to the Nash price. Finally they learn to price slightly higher than Nash.
In summary, eyeballing the data leads to four main findings. (1) In the first part of the experiments
(periods 1-10), average price levels are by and large the same in all treatments. (2) In the first two blocks
of part 2 (periods 11-20), average prices are higher in the Auction and Fixed Cost treatments than in the
Baseline treatment. (3) In the final two blocks of part 2 (periods 21-30), the differences between the
treatments are much less pronounced. (4) The average price level in the Auction is never higher and usually
very close to the average price level in the Fixed Cost treatment.
We now make these findings statistically more precise. The upper part of Table 1 presents prices
by treatment, averaged over blocks of periods. The lower part of the table gives two-tailed significance
levels of Mann-Whitney tests of the differences between treatments. The table shows that average prices
in the first part of the experiment (periods 1-10) are slightly higher in the Fixed Cost treatment than in the
Baseline and Auction treatment, but that these differences are not significant. In the first block of the second
part (periods 11-16), average prices in the Baseline treatment (52.8) are lower than in the Fixed Cost
treatment (71.1) and in the Auction treatment (69.8). The former difference is significant at p=0.06 and the
latter at p=0.01. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the Auction and Fixed Cost treatment.
The price differences between the Baseline treatment on the one hand, and the Fixed Cost and Auction
treatment on the other hand, remain significant in the second block (periods 16-20). In the third and fourth
blocks (periods 21-25 and 26-30, respectively) the picture changes considerably. In both of these blocks,
prices are still lower in the Baseline treatment, but the differences are less pronounced and fail to reach
statistical significance (at p<0.10). An increase in the average price level in the Baseline treatment - where
prices move from levels below Nash (60) in periods 11-20 to above Nash in periods 21-30 - diminishes the
difference between the treatments.
Table 1. Treatment effects
      If we base our test on a comparison of average prices over all blocks of part 2 (periods 11-30), then13
the significance levels of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests are p=0.06 for P =P , p=0.12 for P =P ,BL FC BL AU
and p=1.00 for P =P . Hence, we believe a rejection of the Sunk Cost hypothesis (P =P =P ) wouldSC AU BL FC AU
still be warranted, especially since the alternative Mark-up Pricing hypothesis (P <P =P ) posits a clearBL FC AU
direction for the price difference and a one-tailed test might thus be more appropriate.
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Turning back to our three main hypotheses, we draw the following 'time-contingent' conclusion: (a)
when entry rights are being assigned for the first or second time (periods 11-20), the Mark-up Pricing
hypothesis (P <P =P ) must be accepted at the expense of the Sunk Cost hypothesis (P =P =P ) andBL FC AU BL FC AU
the Selection hypothesis (P =P <P ), and (b) when entry rights are being assigned for the third and theBL FC AU
fourth time, the Sunk Cost hypothesis (P =P =P ) cannot be rejected in favor of either the Mark-upBL FC AU
Pricing hypothesis or the Selection hypothesis.13
4.2 Bidding
From a theoretical perspective the bidding stage is probably best characterized as a common value
auction because of the symmetry between the players' positions. It could be argued that strategic uncertainty
exists about the common value, because one is not certain about the actual strategy of the other player. The
experience gained in the first part of the experiment provides subjects with a private signal of the common
value. The player with the highest signal is likely to win the auction, but if (s)he neglects the fact that in
case of winning the auction the signal was probably too optimistic, (s)he may easily overestimate the value
of the right to play and bid too much. Thus, an interesting question is whether subjects were able to
anticipate the value of the right to play in the Auction treatment.
Table 2. Winning bids and excess profits
Table 2 shows that average winning bids are close to 20,000, the net expected value of the right
to play under the assumption that in all periods the Nash equilibrium of (60,60) will materialize. The table
also shows that subjects do not fall prey to a winner's curse. On average there is an excess profit of entering
the market that may reflect a return for the risk taken. In the course of the experiment there is a decrease
in the excess profit of entering the market. The table suggests that subjects quickly become aware of the
value of the right to play and that they bid competitively to obtain a license.
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4.3 Mark-up pricing
The Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis postulates that players charge higher prices when they have paid
an entry fee. Section 4.1 has shown that a comparison of average price levels across the three treatments
supports this hypothesis. The present section provides a closer investigation of the mark-up pricing
hypothesis on the basis of less aggregated data. First, we examine the relationship between the level of entry
fees and the level of prices. Second, we examine the relationship between prices and profits. Finally, we
analyze in more detail the pricing strategies employed by the subjects.
The Mark-up Pricing hypothesis not only predicts different prices in the Baseline treatment on the
one hand and the Fixed Cost and Auction treatments on the other hand, it also predicts that differences in
entry fees will be reflected in the prices. Higher entry fees should lead to higher prices. To test for this we
use the variation of entry fees within the Auction treatment and the Fixed Cost treatment. In particular,
entry fees average 19,749 with a standard deviation of 5,088, a low of 10,000 to a high of 30,000. Table
3 presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the entry fees that subjects paid and the average
prices they charged for several groups of periods. For each group of periods (1-30, 11-20, and 21-30) we
find a positive correlation between entry fees and prices. In line with mark-up pricing, we find that higher
entry fees lead to higher prices.
Table 3. Correlation between entry fees and prices
Remarkably, in both treatments the correlation between entry fees and prices is more pronounced
in periods 21-30 than in periods 11-20. Hence, there is no evidence that over time subjects learned to
dismiss mark-up pricing. As will be shown below, there was not much reason for them to do so, since on
average mark-up pricing proved quite profitable.
Figure 2. Frequencies of starting prices per treatment
Now we have a closer look at the pricing strategies that lay behind the difference in average prices
between the Baseline treatment on the one hand, and the Fixed Cost and Auction treatment on the other
      This result is corroborated by subjects' bi-modal response to a question in the post-experimental14
questionnaire in the Fixed Cost and Auction treatments. We asked subjects' agreement (on a 7-point scale)
with the statement: "Because in part 2 you had to pay for the right to enter the market, you asked a higher
price than in part 1 of the experiment". 44.6% of the answers were in category 1 or 2, implying that they
(strongly) disagreed with the statement. At the same time, a proportion of 23.0% of the subjects filled out
category 6 or 7, stating their (strong) agreement with the statement.
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hand. Roughly speaking, there are two possibilities. One is that all players are susceptible to mark-up
pricing to some degree. The other is that mark-up pricing is a more heterogeneous phenomenon, with some
players incorporating the entry fee in their prices while others adhere to the sunk cost hypothesis. The data
strongly support this latter possibility. To illustrate this, Figure 2 displays, for each treatment, the
distribution of starting prices immediately after the rights to play have been newly assigned, that is, the
distribution of prices in periods 11, 16, 21 and 26. As can be seen, the frequency distribution of starting
prices in the Baseline treatment is concentrated around the stage game Nash equilibrium price of 60 with
the mode being somewhat below it. The Fixed Cost and Auction treatments also have a mode around the
Nash price of 60 but they also display a concentration of prices at a higher level: around 85 in the Auction
treatment and around 100 in the Fixed Cost treatment. Hence, players' strategies are heterogeneous in how
they deal with an entry fee.  14
Figure 3 shows the relationship between starting prices in a block of five periods and realized
average profits in the corresponding block of five periods. The figure displays both the average profits and
the average profit plus and minus the standard deviation of profits. The figure is based on all blocks and
all treatments (the picture is similar for all three treatments, although, of course, in the Baseline treatment
it is based on a relatively high number of lower starting prices). It can be seen that up until a price of 100
average profits are increasing in the starting price, while the variance of profits increases at the same time.
An increase of prices above 100 does not translate into higher mean profits. Hence, subjects who start a
block of five market periods with a (mark-up) price of 100 earn the highest payoffs on average (i.e., not
controlling for other features of their pricing strategy).
Figure 3. Prices and profits
Next we investigate the dynamic pricing strategies of the players. In section 2 we suggested that
mark-up pricing may be sustainable as an equilibrium if players employ trigger-like strategies. Table 4
      Interestingly, these results, including the asymmetry between punishments and rewards, are in line15
with the results of an extensive questionnaire of managers of UK companies (Hall, Walsh and Yates,
1997). They find that price increases are mainly caused by increases in costs. Price decreases, on the other
hand, are mainly caused by price decreases of competitors. This supports the mark-up pricing interpretation
of the experimental results: firms charge higher prices as a result of the entry fee; subsequently they
decrease their prices in case the other firm's pricing behavior forces them to do so.
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displays, for all treatments combinedly, as well as for each treatment separately, how subjects change their
price from one period to the next, conditional on whether their own price in the previous period is higher
than or lower than their rival's price. Overall, these dynamics are reminiscent of the “measure-for-measure”
strategy found by Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997).
Table 4. Dynamics of pricing behavior
For all treatments combined, we find that players decrease their price in 67% of the cases in which
their own price in the previous period was higher than their competitor’s (high 9 + high 99), whereas they
increase their price in only 13.3% of these cases (high 8). Hence, they punish competitive pricing by their
opponent. At the same time they reward cooperative pricing but here the reactions are more moderate.
Players increase their price in 49.2% of the cases in which their own price was lower than their opponent’s
(low 88 + low 8) but in as much as 32.3% of these cases they decrease their price even further (low 9).
Also the size of the price change is more moderate in case of rewards than in case of punishments. This can
be seen by comparing the ratio of high 99 (34.6%) to high 9 (32.6%) with the ratio of low88 (9.4%) to low
8 (39.4%). In case of punishments subjects often go below the previous lower price of their rival but in case
of rewards they seldomly go above the previous higher price of their rival. Hence, subjects use punishments
more often and more severely than they use rewards (which may explain the downward trend of average
prices within each block of periods that was observed in Figure 1).  15
Further evidence for strategic play can be found in the presence of a clear end-effect. As noted
before, on average there is a decline of prices within each block of 5 periods. However, in the Auction and
Fixed Cost treatments the average price decline from the 4th to the 5th period in a block (-11.5 in absolute
terms for FC and -7.0 for AU) is much stronger than the average decline across the earlier periods within
a block (-0.4 for FC and !1.0 for AU). This end-effect is stronger in the Auction and Fixed Cost treatments
than in the Baseline (-3.2). Moreover, the end-effect is about twice as large in the last two blocks than in
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the first two blocks of part 2, indicating that it becomes stronger with learning (cf. Selten and Stoecker,
1986).
The pricing dynamics illustrate that players employ rewards and punishments. This explains why
an initial price increase due to mark-up pricing cannot be easily exploited by rational players who disregard
the entry fee. As we know from the literature on repeated games (e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986),
cooperative prices may even be supported as an equilibrium when there is incomplete information about the
players’ types, particularly when there is some probability that the other player uses trigger strategies.
When rational players anticipate that there will be some proportion of players who (irrationally) employ
mark-up pricing followed by tit-fot-tat dynamics, then it may well be in their own interest to follow a similar
strategy.
Appendix A illustrates a model this by means of a simple five period model in which players’ prices
are restricted to the set {60,100} and in which there is some probability å that players (irrationally) employ
mark-up pricing followed by a tit-fot-tat strategy. If the players using a trigger strategy start with a price
of 100 it will be easier to sustain collusive prices (and more difficult to support non-collusive prices) than
if they start with a price of 60. Hence, if some fraction of players employs mark-up pricing followed by
trigger strategies, an entry fee increases their first period prices from 60 to 100 and this increases the
incentive for other (rational) players to behave in a likewise manner. For some values of the proportion of
mark-up pricing players collusive pricing (100) is the only possible equilibrium when there are entry fees,
while non-collusive pricing (60) is the only possible equilibrium when there are no entry fees. For some
other values of the proportion of mark-up pricing players both types of equilibria co-exist simultaneously.
Then the entry fee may serve as a selection principle leading the players to coordinate on the collusive
equilibrium. In both cases entry fees increase the probability of the collusive equilibrium and decrease the
probability of the non-collusive equilibrium of the repeated game.
The data reveal that collusion is clustered. That is, the degree of collusive pricing is not uniform
across group, but highly concentrated, with some groups pricing close to the stage game Nash equilibrium
(60) and others setting prices at higher levels (80-100). This does not only hold for prices in the first period
(see Figure 2) but also for later periods. Hence, it is more accurate to say that entry fees increase the
probability of collusion than that they increase the degree of collusion.
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4.4 Selection hypothesis
The preceding analysis suggests that entry fees per se are responsible for increased prices after an
auctioning of entry licenses and not the tendency of auctions to select the more optimistic (i.e., collusive)
bidders. Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows that the jump in prices after period 10 is somewhat higher for the
Auction treatment than for the Fixed Cost treatment. Perhaps there is a slight selection effect at the first
auction. 
A selection effect would provide an upward pressure on prices if the auction would tend to select
players that set high prices. Before we investigate whether selected players charge high prices, we address
the queston whether the auction selects the firms that made the highest profit in the past.
For each of the two winners in an auction, we determine whether her or his assignment as a player
is in accordance with the ranking of her or his average previous profits. In the very first auction (after
period 10) successful players tend to be selected. In 14 out of 18 cases, the winner of the auction either had
made the highest profit or the second highest profit in previous periods. A binomial test rejects the
hypothesis that this is due to mere chance (p=0.03, given the null hypothesis that the probability of being
selected equals 0.5). For the auctions for the next three blocks of periods, however, there is no indication
that the auction selects the players with the highest previous earnings.
Given that the auction only selects successful players in the first block of periods, one might expect
that an upward pressure of selection on prices is only observed after the first assignment of the rights to
play. Table 5 displays average prices in the present block, as well as the average prices in the previous
block(s) for both the presently active and presently inactive players. For periods 11-15 (block 1), there are
clear signs of a selection effect. Average prices are 69.8 in block 1. The players who are active in this block,
charged an average price of 70.0 in the previous block (periods 1-10), whereas the players who are inactive
in block 1 charged an average price of 53.2 in the previous block (this difference is significant according
to a Wilcoxon rank test: n=9, p=0.04). The price history of auction winners and losers is clearly different
here, and average current prices are remarkably close to the average historic prices of the winners. In later
auctions these effects are much weaker. For the second and third auction, the prices in the previous block
are still higher for auction winners than auction losers, but the differences are small.
Table 5. Effects of selection on prices in Auction treatment
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Hence, we do find clear signs for selection of the more collusive (optimistic) players in the first
auction. Nevertheless, this did not result in a substantial effect on the average price level compared with the
Fixed Cost treatment. There is hardly any signs for selection in the later auctions. 
Inactive players observe how successful players operate in the market. They observe prices and
profits of the active players of their group. This gives them an idea about the potential profitability of a
license and of the appropriate price level. As a consequence, spectators may learn to bid and to set prices
like the successful others after the first block of periods. In all the treatments spectators change their
behavior much more often in the direction of the more successful players than in the opposite direction. This
process of imitation usually leads to a substantial increase in price levels, because players with higher prices
tend to generate higher profits in all the treatments (bottom half Table 4). For example, in the 18 relevant
cases of the Fixed Cost treatment spectators observe more successful players choosing a price level of on
average 79.3, and increase their own price levels from on average 61.0 to 81.3. Thus, imitation may have
helped to generate common beliefs about the profitability of a licence and about how the game should be
played. As a consequence, after the first block of periods it does not really matter who is selected by the
auction. Selection only matters at the first assignment, when players have not yet formed common beliefs.
5. Concluding discussion
This paper examined the empirical strength of the argument that the auctioning of entry licenses will
increase market prices. Two potential causes for such an increase were identified. The first one is mark-up
pricing, which hypothesizes that firms will increase market prices in an attempt to recover the entry costs
incurred at the auction. We found clear support for this hypothesis in the short term. Both in the Fixed Cost
and the Auction treatment players charged significantly higher prices than in the Baseline treatment. On the
long term, when the entry licenses had been re-allocated a couple of times, the difference in average price
levels between the treatments tended to become much smaller. Nevertheless, even in the longer term, we
found a significant positive correlation between entry fees and prices. Interestingly, a moderate mark-up
pricing strategy turns out to be quite profitable. Realized average profits where higher at mark-up prices
than at stage game equilibrium prices.
The other possible reason that prices will increase due to auctioning is that an auction will tend to
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select the more collusive players. We found evidence for such a selection effect in the first auction.
Typically, the players winning the first auction tended to be the ones with the highest profits and the highest
prices in the first part of the experiment. At later auctions, however, there were no signs for such a selection
effect. Probably, the information provided in the second part of the experiment helped to form common
beliefs about the profitability of a license to play. Moreover, even the selection effect of the first auction
was found not to have a significant impact on the average price level. Throughout the experiment, the price
level in the Auction treatment was very close to the price level in the Fixed Cost treatment.
When there is uncertainty about the proportion of mark-up pricing players in the population, both
repeated play of stage game Nash prices as well as more collusive (mark-up) prices can be supported as
an equilibrium of the repeated game. The entry fee may serve as a selection principle guiding the players
toward the equilibrium of collusive pricing. Players that start with mark-up pricing followed by a trigger
strategy increase their starting price when they are faced with an entry fee. This increases the incentive for
other (rational) players to behave in a likewise manner. Entry fees thus increase the support for a more
collusive price path.
As discussed earlier, other experimental studies have also found that entry fees affect how subjects
play a game. In particular, entry fees may help players to select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in (median
or minimum effort) coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria (Van Huyck et al., 1993,
Cachon and Camerer, 1996, Crawford and Broseta, 1998). The effect of entry fees in the present study is
in one sense weaker but in another sense stronger. Whereas almost all play is affected by auctioning the
entry rights in coordination games, in our market game only a proportion of play is affected. At the same
time, in another sense our results are stronger. In the coordination experiments, the entry fees induce
subjects to coordinate on a different equilibrium of the stage game, whereas in our experiment the entry fees
induce players to arrive at an outcome which is not an equilibrium of the stage game.
The fact that the effect of the entry fees on our experiment is weaker than in the coordination game
experiments is not surprizing in view of the results of Cachon and Camerer (1996). They find a strong
selection effect of the exogenous entry fee only if the level of the fee is above the payoffs that players tend
to achieve in the baseline periods without an entry fee. If the entry fee is below these baseline payoffs - as
on average they are in our experiment - Cachon and Camerer find a much smaller effect of the entry fee,
because forward induction and loss avoidance have no force in this case. They still find some effect of the
entry fee in this case though, just as Cooper et al. (1993) do for the battle-of-the-sexes-game and just as we
      Without an explicit test, it is hard to speculate whether, to what extent, and in what sense,16
professionals from the field would make different decisions than the students from our subject pool. Several
experimental studies, in a variety of settings, though, have found remarkably little difference between the
experimental conduct of students and that of professionals from the relevant field (e.g., Dyer, Kagel and
Levin, 1989, DeJong, Forsythe and Uecker, 1988, Potters and van Winden, 1999).
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do for the duopoly market game.
 Another difference between the coordination games and our market game is the welfare effect of
auctioning the right to play. In coordination games, the effect of the entry fee is sometimes welcomed as a
Pareto improvement. “The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play [in coordination
games] suggests a new and potentially important way in which competition may promote efficiency”, as
Crawford and Broseta (1998, p. 221) note. However, in our market game auctioning leads to higher prices
and consequently to welfare losses. The consumers - though not present as active players in the experiment -
are hurt by the increase in prices. 
Of course, one should be very cautious in trying to translate our experimental results into policy
conclusions. Apart from the fact that we used students as decisionmakers instead of businessmen or
managers , the stylized market setting in our experiment cannot capture the many intricacies of "real world"16
market environments. Arguably, the most important omission in our experimental design is firm
heterogeneity. In our experimental design all firms have identical cost functions, whereas in real markets
firms differ, for example, in terms of their technological, organizational, and financial strategies. Efficiency
then requires the licenses to be allocated to the most efficient firms, in particular to those that produce at
lowest cost. These firms probably expect to make more profit than productively inefficient firms. As a
consequence, they would make higher bids in an auction and win the auction. Thus, in the real world an
important efficiency-enhancing selection effect of auctions exists, which is absent from our experiments.
Therefore, our experiments do not provide an argument against the auctioning of entry licenses per se.
Our experimental results can be interpreted though as challenging the revenue raising aspect of
auctions. Often the entry fees collected at an auction are seen as welcome by-products to governments that
come at no welfare costs and may be used to reduce distortive taxes. However, our experimental results
show that entry fees increase the probability of collusive pricing and that higher fees may lead to higher
prices. Hence, the entry fees come at the expense of some efficiency loss. This suggests that for efficiency
purposes it may be more prudent to choose an allocation mechanism which retains the positive selection
24
properties of an auction, but leaves the surplus as much as possible with the bidders. 
One possibility would be to look for auctions that minimize rather than maximize expected revenue
or to a mechanism that redistributes the auction revenue to the winning bidders. This involves interesting
but intricate mechanism design problems, which obviously we do not intend to solve here. Another
possibility to discard revenue collection while retaining efficient selection, is to change the determination
of the auction winner. Rather than allocating entry rights to the bidders who are willing to pay the highest
entry fee, the winners could be those that are willing to serve the market at the lowest prices. This is, of
course, a well-known idea and not devoid of its own difficulties (e.g., Demsetz, 1968, Williamson, 1976).
For markets in which services and technologies evolve relatively slowly (such as fairgrounds) this may be
more relevant than for very dynamic markets (such as telecommunication). Perhaps though, the idea may
receive some additional ammunition from our finding that entry fees, and not just market power, may be
responsible for efficiency losses in oligopolistic markets.
However, a complicating factor is that political considerations are not necessarily aligned with
welfare-economic ones. For example, one argument which is sometimes raised in favor of auctioning is that
firms should not be allowed to receive "windfall profits" from employing a scarce public resource (like the
radio spectrum). Hence, even if efficient selection mechanisms could be devised that leave the surplus with
the firms, political arguments may be raised against such a mechanism. Probably though, the most
important political argument in favor of auctioning is the revenue itself. In previous centuries rulers were
clearly motivated by the money raised by selling offices to the highest bidder (see footnote 2). Also the
political discussions about the recent spectrum auctions often seem to center around the amount of money
that is generated and on how to spend it. Hence, mechanisms which reduce revenue collection, even if
economically sound, may have a hard time to pass the test of political feasibility. But even if so, it is still




We examine the conditions under which collusive (mark-up) prices and non-collusive (stage game Nash)
prices can be sustained as an equilibrium of the repeated game when there is some probability that the rival
player (irrationally) employs mark-up pricing followed by tit-for-tat. To make matters as simple as possible
assume that there are only two possible prices: p  = 60 and p  = 100. That is, in each period t (t = 1,...5)N C
the following normal form game is played:
p  = 100 p  = 60C N
p  = 100 7560 , 7560 1800 , 8200C
p  = 60 8200, 1800 5000, 5000N
Assume that there is a commonly known probability , that a player is irrational and plays a tit-for-tat
pricing strategy. Hence, with p  denoting the other player’s price in period t, such a player plays p  = pj,t i,t j,t-1
(t = 2,...5). We restrict attention to the following two extreme cases: (a) irrational players start with a price
of p  = 100 (because they employ mark-up pricing and there is an entry fee), and (b) irrational players starti,1
with a price of p  = 60 (because there is no entry fee).i,1
First, we examine for which values of , it is an equilibrium strategy in the repeated game for a
rational player to choose a price of 60 in each period: p  = 60, t = 1,...,5. Table A refers to this equilibriumi,t
as "non-cooperation".
In case (a) the expected payoff of the proposed strategy is 25000+3200,. The question is, given
that all rational players follow this strategy, would it be profitable for a rational player to deviate? The best
deviation would be to play cooperatively in the first period p  = 100, see whether the other player is ani,1
irrational tit-for-tat type (p  = p , t = 2, 3, 4), and then to defect in the last period (p  =60). The expectedi,t j,t-1 i,5
payoff of this deviation is 21800(1-,)+38440,, which is worse than the proposed equilibrium strategy if
, < 0.24.
In case (b) the expected payoff of this strategy is 25000. The most profitable deviation would be
to play cooperatively for the first two periods p  = p  = 100, see whether the other player is of thei,1 i,2
irrational tit-for-tat type (p  = p , t = 3,4) and then to defect in the last period (p  = 60). The expectedi,t j,t-1 i,5
payoff of this deviation is 18600(1-,)+32680,, which is worse than the proposed equilibrium strategy if
, < 0.45. 
Second, we examine when it is an equilibrium strategy for the rational players to start playing
cooperatively (p  = 100), followed by a tit-for-tat strategy (p  = p , t = 2, 3, 4) and defection in the lasti,1 i,t j,t-1
period (p  = 60). i,5
In case (a) the expected payoff of this strategy is 35240(1-,)+38440,. The most profitable
deviation would be to start defecting one period earlier: p  = 60. The expected payoff of this deviation is:i,4
35880, which is worse than the proposed equilibrium if , > 0.20. Table A refers to this equilibrium as
"collusion".
In case (b) the proposed equilibrium strategy of the rational players should be made slightly more
patient (p  = p  = 100, p  = p , t = 3, 4, p  = 60), otherwise an irrational type will already triggeri,1 i,2 i,t j,t-1 i,5
retaliation after period 1. However, this strategy can never be an equilibrium. After the first period, a
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rational player will know whether the opponent is rational (p  = 100) or irrational (p  = 60). In the formerj,1 j,1
case, it is better to start defection one period earlier: p  = 60 rather than p  = p . But defecting just onei,4 i,4 j,3
period earlier cannot be an equilibrium strategy for a rational player either, since defection yet again a
period earlier would be a profitable deviation if the opponent player is known to be a rational type (p  =j,1
100). As a consequence, the only possible equilibrium strategy with ‘some’ cooperation is for a rational
player to play p  = 100 and p  = p  = p  = p  = 60 if p  = 100 and p  = p  = p  = 100, p  = 60 ifi,1 i,2 i,3 i,4 i,5 j,1 i,2 i,3 i,4 i,5 
p  = 60. The expected payoffs of this strategy exceed those of a devation towards always defecting (p  =j,1 i,t
60, t = 1,..,5) as long as , > 0.33. Note, however, that in this equilibrium cooperation is only partly realized:
two rational types only cooperate in the first period, a rational and an irrational type only cooperate in
periods 2-4 and two irrational types do not cooperate at all. Table A refers to this equilibrium as "partial
collusion". 
The results of this stylized model are summarized in Table A. It appears that in the Fixed Cost and
the Auction treatment collusion is supported as an equilibrium for a larger set of values for ,, and that at
the same time always playing the stage game equilibrium is supported as an equilibrium for a smaller set
for , than in the Baseline treatment.
Table A
Equilibria of incomplete information model
proportion of "irrational" firms (å)
equilibria Baseline Fixed Cost/Auction
non-cooperation 0 # , # 0.45 0 # , # 0.24
collusion (FC/AU) -
partial collusion (BL)
0.33 # , # 1 0.20 # , # 1
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Appendix B. Experimental instructions
Instructions (distributed and read aloud)
Welcome to this experiment on decisionmaking. During the experiment you wil be asked to make a number
of decisions. Your decisions and the decisions of other participants will determine how much money you
earn. We will first go through the instructions of the experiment together. Then you will get the opportunity
to ask questions. 
The experiment consists of two parts, and each part consists of several periods. In each period your
earnings will be denoted in points. Your earnings in the experiment will be equal to the sum of the earnings
in each of the periods. At the end of the experiment your earnings in points will be transfered into money.
For each 100 points that you earn, you will receive 5 cents. Hence, 2000 points is equal to 1 guilder. Your
earnings will be privately paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
We will start with the first part of the experiment. After the first part has ended, you will receive
the instructions for the second part.
Instructions part 1
Part 1 consists of 10 periods. The only decision you will have to make in each period, is to determine your
price for the good that is produced by you. Your earnings in points are fully determined by your price and
the price charged by one of the other participants. During the first part of the experiment you will only be
dealing with this one other participant. You will not know with which other participant you will be dealing,
nor will the other participant know with whom he or she is dealing.
Prices and production
In each period you determine the price of your product. Your price has to be larger than or equal to 0 points
and smaller than or equal to 200 points. You can only choose integer values.
Your price, as well as the price chosen by the other participant affect the quantity that you will sell.
The higher your price, the less you will sell. The higher the price of the other participant, the more you will
sell. To be precise, the amount of production that you will sell is equal to: 
your production =  124 - 2*(your price) + 1.6*(other's price)
In words this formula amounts to the following. If your and the other's price are both equal to 0, you will
produce and sell 124 goods. For each point that you increase your price, your production will decrease by
2 goods. For each point that the other increases her or his price, your production will increase by 1.6 goods.
You will always produce an integer number of goods. If the above formula does not result in an integer
number, the number will be rounded. Your production will never be negative. If you charge a very high
price (200 for example) and the other a very low price (0 for example), then your production will simply
be zero goods.
In order to make things a little easier, we have constructed a production-table. This table is added
to the instructions. Have a look at this table now. Prices of the other participant are indicated above the
columns. Your own prices are indicated next to the rows. If you want to know how much you will produce
if, for example, the other's price is 100 and your price is 70, then you first move to the right until you find
the column with 100 above it, and then you move down until you reach the row which has 70 on the left of
it. You can read that you will produce 144 goods in that case. The table is not exhaustive. The table does
not list all possible combinations of prices. For example, the table does not indicate what your production
will be if you choose a price of 71 and the other chooses a price of 103. If you want to know exactly how
much your production will be in such a case, you can use the pocket calculator that is on your desk.
The production of the other firm is determined in the same way as your production. To be precise,
the production of the other participant is equal to:
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other's production = 124 - 2*(other's price) + 1.6*(your price)
It also holds for the other participant that he or she produces 124 if both you and the other choose a price
of 0 points. For each piont that the other increases her or his price, the other's production decreases by 2
goods. For each point that you increase your price, the other's production increases by 1.6 goods.
Production and costs
Producing goods costs money. Each good that you produce will cost you 10 points. These are your only
costs of production. Notice that you will make a loss if you choose a price below 10 points. The costs of
production of the other participant are determined in the same way as your costs. The other participant also
pays 10 points for each good that he or she produces.
Profits
In each period your revenue is equal to your price times your production. Your profit in points is then equal
to your revenue minus the costs of your production. To be precise, your profit is equal to:
your profit = (your price)*(your production) - 10*(your production)
This can also be written as:
your profit = (your price - 10)*(your production)
Notice that your price has a two-fold effect on your profit. On the one hand, an increase in your price will
increase your profit, since each good that your produce will earn you more money. On the other hand, an
increase in your price will decrease your profit, since you will be producing and selling less.
For the other participant profit is determined in an identical manner. The profit of the other
participant is equal to her or his revenue, (other's price)*(other's production), minus the cost of production,
10*(other's production).
Information
When you decide about your price, you do not know which price the other participant chooses in that
period. The other participant does not know your price either at the time he or she decides. You will be
informed about the price of the other participant only after all participants of the experiment have entered
their prices.
On your screen you will be able to see the prices and results of the preceding period. If you want
to have the decisions of earlier periods at your disposal, you need to keep track of these yourself. For that
purpose you can use the "Results Form part 1" that you can find on your desk. The rows on this form
correspond to the period numbers. The first four columns are reserved for your price, the other's price, your
profit, and the other's profit, respectively. If you want to keep track of additional information, for example,
on production or costs, then you can use the remaining four columns on the form.
At the top left of your screen you will see the current period number, and the number of points you
have earned up till then. 
Summary
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 periods. During these 10 periods you are matched with one
of the other participants. In each period, you decide about your price, and the other participant decides
about her or his price. You profit in each period will be determined by your price and the price of the other
participant. The circumstances are identical in each of the ten periods. Your earnings in points for the first
part of the experiment are equal to the sum of your profits in these ten rounds.
At the end of period 10 you will receive the instructions for the second and final part of the
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experiment.
Now you will have the opportunity to study the instructions at your own pace and to ask questions. Then
there will be a practice period before we start the experiment. It is not allowed to communicate with other
participants. If you have a question please raise your hand. One of use will come to your table to answer
your question.
Result form part 1
period your other's your other's  

















0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
0 124 140 156 172 188 204 220 236 252 268 284 300 316 332 348 364 380 396 412 428 444
10 104 120 136 152 168 184 200 216 232 248 264 280 296 312 328 344 360 376 392 408 424
20 84 100 116 132 148 164 180 196 212 228 244 260 276 292 308 324 340 356 372 388 404
30 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304 320 336 352 368 384
40 44 60 76 92 108 124 140 156 172 188 204 220 236 252 268 284 300 316 332 348 364
50 24 40 56 72 88 104 120 136 152 168 184 200 216 232 248 264 280 296 312 328 344
60 4 20 36 52 68 84 100 116 132 148 164 180 196 212 228 244 260 276 292 308 324
70 0 0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304
80 0 0 0 12 28 44 60 76 92 108 124 140 156 172 188 204 220 236 252 268 284
90 0 0 0 0 8 24 40 56 72 88 104 120 136 152 168 184 200 216 232 248 264
100 0 0 0 0 0 4 20 36 52 68 84 100 116 132 148 164 180 196 212 228 244
110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 176 192 208 224
120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 28 44 60 76 92 108 124 140 156 172 188 204
130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 40 56 72 88 104 120 136 152 168 184
140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 20 36 52 68 84 100 116 132 148 164
150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144
160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 28 44 60 76 92 108 124
170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 40 56 72 88 104
180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 20 36 52 68 84
190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 32 48 64
200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 28 44
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Instructions part 2 (distributed and read aloud after the completion of part 1)
Text for the Baseline treatment between parentheses (), for the Fixed Costs treatment between brackets [],
and for the Auction treatment between accolades {}.
The second part of the experiment consists of period 11 up until period 30. Hence, there will be another 20
periods. For each participant the conditions will be identical to those in the first part of the experiment. This
means that production, costs and profits are determined in in the exact same manner as in part 1.
In part 2, however, not all participants will be making a decision in all periods. Each participant
will be assigned to a group of 4 participants. From this group of four, there will only be two who will
receive the right to produce. Just like in the first part of the experiment they will determine the price of their
good, and, depending on the prices chosen, make a certain profit. The two other participants will not have
the right to produce; they do not make decisions. The right to produce is assigned for 5 periods at the time.
Since there are 20 periods to go, the rights will be assigned 4 times in total. For periods 11-15 first, then
for periods 16-20, 21-25, and, finally, for periods 26-30.
( For each block of 5 periods the computer will, in a completely random manner, select two of the
four participants who receive the right to produce. Everyone has the same chance to be selected. )
[ For each block of 5 periods the computer will, in a completely random manner, select two of the
four participants who receive the right to produce. Everyone has the same chance to be selected. If you
receive the right to produce, you will pay a certain one-off amount for this. You cannot affect the size of
this amount, and the amount will be deduced from your total earnings automatically.]
{ For each block of 5 periods an auction will determine who receives the right to produce. Just like
the three other participants you will enter a bid for the right to produce. A bid must be above or equal to
0 points and below or equal to 50,000 points. A bid has to be an integer amount. Out of the four bids, the
two highest bids will be selected. The two participants who submitted these bids will receive the right to
produce in the next 5 periods. If two or more participants enter identical bids, then the computer will order
them in a random manner. 
After the bids by all participants have been entered, for each group of four the two highest will be
selected. If your bid is among the highest two, you receive the right to produce in the next 5 periods and
make profits. In return for this right you will pay an amount that is equal to your bid. This amount will be
automatically deduced from your total earnings. If your bid is not among the highest two, you will not
receive the right to produce in the next five periods. In that case, you also do not need to pay your bid.}
If you receive the right to produce, then during the next 5 periods you will be dealing with the one
participant who received the right to produce together with you. Your price and the price of this other
participant will determine how much profit you will make in each period in the same way as in part 1 of the
experiment. Also you will receive the same information as in part 1.
If you do not receive the right to produce, you will not make any decisions in the next 5 periods.
Yet, in each of the 5 periods, you will earn a fixed amount of 1000 points, that is, 5000 points over the 5
periods. You will also receive information about the prices, production, costs, and profits of the two
participants that did receive the right to produce (for convenience these two participants will be referred to
as 'firm A' and firm B').
The two participants that do make decisions, as well as, the two participants that do not make
decisions, will see all prices and results of the preceding period on their screens. If you want to keep track
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of additional information, you can use the "Results form part 2" that is attached to these instructions. 
( At the completion of a block of 5 periods, the rights will be assigned anew. Again all participants
will have an equal chance to be selected. At the completion of the fourth block of 5 periods (periods 26-30),
the experiment ends.)
[ At the completion of a block of 5 periods, the rights will be assigned anew. Again all participants
will have an equal chance to be selected. The amount you will have to pay for the right to produce may be
different though. At the completion of the fourth block of 5 periods (periods 26-30), the experiment ends.]
{ At the completion of a block of 5 periods, the rights will be auctioned anew. Again all participants
will have to enter a bid for the right to produce for the next 5 periods. The rights will again be assigned in
the manner described above. At the completion of the fourth block of 5 periods (periods 26-30), the
experiment ends.}
(Summarizing, there are two possibilities for each block of 5 periods. Either you receive the right to
produce. In that case you have 5 periods in which you have the possibility to make a profit. Or you do not
receive the right to produce. In that case you will earn a fixed amount of 1000 points in each periods, that
is 5000 points in total.)
[Summarizing, there are two possibilities for each block of 5 periods. Either you receive the right to
produce. In that case you pay a certain one-off amount for this right, and you will have 5 periods in which
you have the possibility to make a profit. Or you do not receive the right to produce. In that case you do
not need to pay anything, and you will earn a fixed amount of 1000 points in each periods, that is 5000
points in total.]
{Summarizing, there are two possibilities for each block of 5 periods. Either you receive the right to
produce. In that case you pay a one-off amount that is equal to your bid, and you will have 5 periods in
which you have the possibility to make a profit. Or you do not receive the right to produce. In that case you
do not need to pay anything, and you will earn a fixed amount of 1000 points in each periods, that is 5000
points in total.
It is possible, though not likely, that you will make a loss. If you bid more than you have earned
up to that point, and your profits in the 5 periods do not make up for this, then you make a loss. A loss can
be easily prevented though, by never bidding more than your total earnings up to that point.}
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1-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
treatment
P 61.8 52.8 57.1 66.2 65.7BL
P 66.9 71.1 79.0 74.9 77.6SC
P 61.6 69.8 77.1 76.4 67.6AU
hypothesis
P =P p=0.60 p=0.06 p=0.02 p=0.10 p=0.11BL SC
P =P p=1.00 p=0.01 p=0.03 p=0.17 p=0.46BL AU
P =P p=0.74 p=0.84 p=0.68 p=0.87 p=0.24SC AU
Notes: P  (P ; P ) displays the average price level in the Baseline (Fixed Cost; Auction) treatment. For theBL FC AU
hypotheses, two-tailed significance levels of Mann-Whitney tests are presented with the following number of
observations per treatment: n =10; n =10; n =9.BL FC AU
Table 2
Winning bids and excess profits
treatment periods winning bids (std. dev.) excess profit (std. dev.)
Auction
(n=18)
11-15 17,829.9  (5,441.9) 5,002.4  (6,891.0)
16-20 19,062.3  (3,628.0) 4,999.5  (10,019.2)
21-25 20,070.3  (3,924.3) 3,865.5  (8,065.4)
26-30 20,863.3  (3,828.6) 1,085.3  (4,018.8)
Notes: The column winning bids displays the average winning bids; the column excess profit displays the
aggregate profits in a block of periods minus the own bid minus the opportunity costs (5000) averaged over
players in the auction. In the first block the bid of the subject who wrongly assumed the right to last for 10 periods
is divided by two.
Table 3
Correlation between entry fees and prices
treatment correlation 1-30 11-20 21-30
period
Fixed Cost fixed cost: D=0.29 D=0.17 D=0.27
average price p=0.00; n=120 p=0.14; n=40 p=0.05; n=40
Auction winning bid: D=0.38 D=0.22 D=0.42
average price p=0.00; n=108 p=0.10; n=36 p=0.00; n=36
Notes: For period 1-10 the entry fees are equal to 0. The entries display Spearman rank correlation coefficients
(D), significance level of the correlation (p), and the number of paired observations (n). Each block of periods for
each player yields a paired data point. 
Table 4
Dynamics of pricing behavior
treatment position + frequency position + frequency 
direction of percentage direction of percentage
change change
all
high 8 51 13.3% low 88 36 9.4%
high = 75 19.5% low 8 153 39.8%
high 9 125 32.6% low = 71 18.5%
high 99 133 34.6% low 9 124 32.3%
Baseline
high 8 12 11.7% low 88 8 7.8%
high = 23 22.3% low 8 37 35.9%
high 9 40 38.8% low = 18 17.5%
high 99 28 27.2% low 9 40 38.8%
Fixed Cost
high 8 24 15.9% low 88 17 11.3%
high = 23 15.2% low 8 65 43.0%
high 9 50 33.1% low = 29 19.2%
high 99 54 35.8% low 9 40 26.5%
Auction
high 8 15 11.5% low 88 11 8.5%
high = 29 22.3% low 8 51 39.2%
high 9 35 26.9% low = 24 18.5%
high 99 51 39.2% low 9 44 33.8%
Notes: "high 8" refers to cases in which a firm charged a higher price than its rival in the previous period and
raises its price in the present period. "high =" refers to cases where a firm charged a higher price in the previous
period and does not alter its price in the present period. "high 9" ("high 99") refers to cases where a firm charged
a higher price in the previous period and decreases its price such that it is greater (smaller) than or equal to the
price charged by the other firm in the previous period. "low --" is defined in a similar way, except that these
entries refer to cases where the firm charged a lower price than its rival in the previous period. This table only
uses cases where firms' prices were unequal in the previous period and both larger than or equal to 60. Starting
prices in each block (periods 1, 11, 16, 21, 26) are excluded.
Table 5
Effects of selection on prices in Auction treatment
period 11-15 period 16-20 period 21-25 period 26-30
average own play= play= play= play= play= play= play= play=
price no yes no yes no yes no yes
all previous
blocks
53.2 70.0 63.4 65.5 67.4 68.1 72.4 67.0
previous
block
53.2 70.0 66.7 73.6 76.0 77.9 78.0 74.8
this block
 
-- 69.8 -- 77.1 -- 76.4 -- 67.6
Notes: The table displays the average price charged by a player in the present block and her or his average prices
in the previous block. It also displays the previous average price per block for present spectators.
Figure 1
Average price levels in the three treatments
Figure 2
Frequencies of starting prices per treatment
Notes: Running frequencies of starting prices after licenses have been newly assigned. For each starting price
displayed at the horizontal axis the vertical axis reports the % of outcomes that fall in the interval [starting price-7,
starting price+7].
Figure 3
Average profits per period as a function of starting prices
Notes: The thick line represents the running mean profits as function of starting price for all treatments. A firm's
profits are averaged over the 5 periods in the block of the particular starting price. For each starting price P at the
horizontal axis the vertical axis reports the mean profit of starting prices in the interval [P-7,P+7]. The upper
(lower) line represents the running mean profit plus (minus) the standard deviation. There were only three
starting prices higher than 120: these are discarded.
